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The Excess in Environmental Regulation
of the Water Resource

Stuart L. Somach*
I.

INTRODUCTION

As has been the case with many areas of resource development,
water resources development has become increasingly subject to intense environmental scrutiny and regulation. In the abstract, this
regulation is appropriate. When one considers the vital role that
water plays in the health of any ecosystem and the significant aesthetic
values placed on the resource by society in general, a full evaluation
of the environmental effect of water resource development is imperative. The level and method of evaluation, however, must be reasonable. The effects upon society and those who wish to develop the
resource must be considered, and the evaluation process itself cannot
be allowed to become so intimidating as to discourage reasonable
and beneficial development opportunities.
This article will first explore the rationale and need for environmental evaluation and protection of the water resource. The article
will then explore the various means of environmental evaluation and
protection afforded the water resource, at both the federal and state
levels. The article will conclude (through use of case examples) by
examining the undesirable effect that excessive application of regulatory measures can have on reasonable and beneficial development,

* Attorney and shareholder in the law firm of McDonough, Holland & Allen, Sacramento, California; J.D. University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; B.A. San Jose
State University.
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and will suggest methods of avoiding the demonstrated regulatory
excess.
II. THE HISTORY AND NEED FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION'
A.

Environmental Protection Prior to the Decade of the 1970s

It would be improper to assert that prior to the 1970s there had
not developed an environmental ethic in the United States. This is
particularly true if one considers the writings of Henry David Thoreau, John Muir and Aldo Leopold, among others. 2 The writings
and actions of these individuals have formed the very strong bedrock
upon which the environmental legal framework of the 1970s was
built. However, the evolution of the environmental ethic in the United
States in many ways reflects the development of the nation as a
whole. In a situation where resources are in abundance, conservation
3
is not normally a goal.
In the United States resources were, until the last few decades, in
apparent abundance and the environment generally was considered
something to be subdued, not preserved. Alexis de Tocqueville in
Democracy in America commented that:
[I]n Europe people talk a great deal of the wilds of America, but
the Americans themselves never think about them; they are insensitive to the wonders of inanimate nature and they may be said not
to perceive the mighty forests that surround them till they fall
beneath the hatchet. Their eyes are fixed upon another sight... they
... march across these wilds, draining swamps and turning the
4
course of rivers, peopling solitudes and subduing nature.

1. It is beyond the scope of the instant article to trace, in detail, the history of the
development of environmental law within the United States or even within California. Moreover,
the field of environmental law itself can be divided into many diverse areas ranging from
general environmental protections to the more specific areas of the law which regulate tile use,
effect and consequences of toxic substances. For the instant discussion, it is sufficient to focus
briefly upon the broad protections afforded the environment, generally, and wildlife and
aesthetics, in particular. The goal is to convey a sense of how the law developed to its current
status rather than to make an exhaustive study of the history of the development of environmental law within the United States.
2. The writings of these individuals are extensive and would be beyond the author's
ability to summarize here. An explanation of these works and their application to the instant
thesis can be found in R. NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND, 84-95, 122-140, 182199 (3d ed. 1982).
3. See R. NASH, supra, note 2, at pp. 23-43.
4. 1 A. DE TocQuEvILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 2, 74 (P. Bradley ed. 1945) (citing R.
NASH, supra, note 2, at 23).
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Roderick Nash, in Wilderness and the American Mind, noted that
Tocqueville, on the whole, was correct in his analysis that 'living
in the wilds' produced a bias against them. Constant exposure to
wilderness gave rise to fear and hatred on the part of those who
had to fight it for survival and success. Although there were a few
exceptions, American frontiersmen rarely judged wilderness with
criteria other than the utilitarian or spoke of their relation to it in
other than a military metaphor. It was their children and grandchildren, removed from the wilderness condition, who began to
5
sense its ethical and aesthetic values.
As a consequence of continued growth and development in the United
States, as well as the pressure created by the writings and teachings
of individuals like Thoreau, Muir and Leopold, certain limited actions
were taken to preserve and protect isolated resources within the
United States.
Thus, at the federal level 6 Yellowstone National Park was established in 1872, while the first state level preservation action was the
establishment of the Adirondack Forest Preserve in 1892 by the State
of New York. 7 These actions were followed by the establishment of
Yosemite National Park, 8 and, in 1916, by the establishment of the
National Parks System. 9 It was not until 1968 that Congress established the National Wild and Scenic Rivers Systems, the first specific
protection associated with the water resource. 0 These actions, however, were not broad based in nature. Rather, they were isolated
attempts to preserve certain areas which, because of their unique
qualities (and vocal supporters), were determined to need preservation.
The development of more generalized environmental protections in
all important respects did not materialize until the 1970s. The law
until that time, with the exception of the specific type of preservation
measures discussed above, was focused on traditional property law
concepts. Environmental concerns were addressed through combinations of nuisance, injunctive, damage and strict liability actions."
Although from time to time public interest and public trust concepts

5. R. NASH, supra note 2, at 43.
6. Act of March 1, 1872, ch. 24, 17 Stat. 32.
7. Id.
8. Act of February 7, 1905, ch. 547, 33 Stat. 702.
9. Act of August 25, 1916, ch. 408, 39 Stat. 535.
10. Act of October 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906.
11. The classic problem associated with this type of legal "protection" is found in Boomer
v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
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appeared to limit actions that would otherwise have an adverse effect
upon the environment, these concepts were utilized not to protect
the environment, per se, but to protect one type of resource exploi2
tation from another.'
Where the law did attempt to focus on more generalized environmental concerns, it did so in an inadequate manner. For example,
with respect to the water resource, Congress enacted the Federal

Water Pollution Control Act of 194813 (FWPCA). This Act initially
was not particularly strong and delegated most of the pertinent
authority to limit pollution to the states. From 1956 through 1970
the Act was strengthened on five separate occasions.' 4 It was not
until the enactment of the FWPCA amendments of 19721 and the
Clean Water Act of 197716 that adequate environmental protections
for the water resource were put into place.

Far from being a time of real environmental protection, the period
prior to the 1970s is best characterized as a period where legislation
focused on subduing the environment. Thus, at the same time leg-

islation was enacted to preserve certain specific and limited areas of
the nation, other laws were passed, particularly related to the West,

which were intended to foster development.' 7 Chief among these, and
most relevant to the area of water resource management, was the
Reclamation Act of 1902.18 This Act did not provide for any type
of environmental review and was intended for "the construction and
maintenance of irrigation works for the storage, diversion, and
development of waters for the reclamation of arid and semi-arid
lands in the ... states . ..."19Indeed, it must be kept in mind that
the law of appropriative water rights in the West encouraged the

12. See Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. 387 (1892); People v. California Fish Co.,
166 Cal. 516, 138 P. 79 (1913).
13. Federal Water Pollution Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).
14. Water Quality Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 91-224 tit. 1, §§ 101-107, 109-112, 84
Stat. 91 (1970); Clean Water Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246 (1966); Water
Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965); Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 87-88, 75 Stat. 204 (1961); Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 518,
§ 1, 73 Stat. 498 (1956).
15. Act of October 18, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816.
16. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1972).
17. A typical example of this type of inconsistent legislation which invariably tipped in
favor of development may be the enactment of the Raker Act which allowed the damming of
the Hetch-Hetchy Valley, even though it was within the Yosemite National Park. See R. NASH,
supra note 2, at 161-81.
18. Reclamation Act, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (1902).
19. Id. ch. 1093, sec. 1.
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utilization of all of the water in a stream without regard to the effect
that drying up a stream would have on the environment.
B.

Wildlife Protection Prior to the Decade of the 1970s

Prior to 1900, the law, as it related to wildlife, was based upon a
public trust concept which found that "ownership" of wildlife was
vested in the states for the benefit of the people. 20 The doctrine of
state ownership of wildlife has traditionally been thought to authorize, in the absence of affirmative federal regulation or express constitutional restraint, state regulation of private activity directly
2
pertaining to wildlife within state borders1.
This concept, as well as
limitations on its application, were found to be constitutionally based
in specific federal powers emanating from the federal treaty making
power, property power, and commerce power. The history of wildlife
law in the United States is a history of eroding state ownership
claims in light of asserted federal supremacy.
In 1916 the United States executed a treaty with Great Britain (on
behalf of Canada) for the protection of migratory birds. 22 The
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (the treaty's implementing legislation) was
passed in 1918.23 In Missouri v. Holland,24 the United States Supreme
Court found the treaty and its implementing Act constitutional,
establishing the supremacy of the federal treaty making power as a
source of authority for federal wildlife regulation. Subsequently, the
United States Supreme Court found sources of authority for federal
wildlife regulation within the property clause of the United States
Constitution2 5 and within the commerce clause. 26
The major thrust toward wildlife protection began in much the
same way as did the environmental protections discussed above. The
legislation was focused upon the desire to protect certain species as

20.

See, e.g., Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
See M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 37 (1983).
22. Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, August 16, 1916, United StatesGreat Britain (on behalf of Canada), 39 Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628.
23. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 703-11).
24. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
25. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96
(1928).
26. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (Migratory Bird Treaty Act also valid as
an exercise of federal power under the commerce clause); Foster-Fountain Parking Company
v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).

21.
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a resource base or because of some unique qualities. Thus, the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act was enacted to protect certain species due
to the need to harbor the food source provided by those species.
The Bald Eagle Protection Act 27 was passed because Congress felt
that the bald eagle, the nation's symbol, was threatened. These
statutes, as they were originally drafted, focused upon prohibitions
on takings of species and did not deal with the consequence of
habitat destruction on species viability. However, Congress recognized
the need to consider the effects of development, particularly water
resources development, on fish and wildlife much earlier than it did
in the area of general environmental review. In 1934, Congress
enacted the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act. 28 Nonetheless, until
the 1970s, the status of wildlife law was not too dissimilar from that
of environmental law in general.
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, with its broad-based
requirement that water projects be reviewed for their effect on fish
and wildlife, served as a model for the type of environmental review
which was developed in the 1970s.
III.

CURRENT ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION AND PROTECTIONS

It was not until the 1970s, with the full blossoming of the environmental movement in the United States, that legal mechanisms
were developed to provide the broad-based protections that were
needed to guard against unnecessary environmental degradation. These
statutes provide a procedural mechanism which insures that the effects
of human development on the environment will be identified and
fully evaluated prior to the time that the development activity is
initiated. Once the effects of the development are evaluated, substantive safeguards come into play to limit human activities. As noted
above, an exhaustive discussion of any or all of these statutes is
beyond the scope of this article. Instead, a brief review of certain
significant federal and state statutes should establish the underlying
framework for further discussion.
A.

Federal Environmental Protection of the Water Resource

27. Bald Eagle Protection Act, ch. 278, 54 Stat. 250 (1940).
28. Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, ch. 55, 48 Stat. 401 (1934). This Act has been
amended numerous times since its initial enactment.
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1.

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969

The goals and purposes of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)29 are sweeping and contain Congress' most comprehensive
statements recognizing the need for environmental protection. NEPA
provides that the policies, regulations and public laws of the United
States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the
policy contained in NEPA and that all agencies of the federal
government shall prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS)
for all major federal actions which significantly affect the quality of
30
the human environment.
Regulations promulgated by the Council of Environmental Quality
(CEQ) explain when and how to apply NEPA. 31 They also explain
how an agency is to determine if it is necessary to prepare an EIS.
The regulations explain that:
The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to
serve as an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and
goals defined in the Act are infused into the ongoing programs and
actions of the Federal Government. It shall provide full and fair
discussion of significant environmental impacts and shall inform
decision-makers and the public of the reasonable alternatives which
would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of
the human environment. Agencies shall focus on significant environmental issues and alternatives and shall reduce paperwork and
the accumulation of extraneous background data. Statements shall
be concise, clear, and to the point, and shall be supported by
evidence that the agency has made the necessary environmental
analyses. An environmental impact statement is more than a disclosure document. It shall be used by Federal officials in conjunction
32
with other relevant material to plan actions and make decisions.
NEPA, therefore, is not intended to preclude particular actions,
but seeks to require a thorough review of the environmental implications of a given action to ensure that the consequences to the
environment are considered prior to the action being undertaken.
NEPA was intended to provide an environmental "hard look" that
would overcome the mission oriented decision making that, until the

29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4323 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
30.
31.
32.

Id. §§ 102, 105.
40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1517 (July 1, 1987).
Id. § 1562.1.
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enactment of NEPA, was typical of federal programs.33 NEPA does
not seek to halt any given action nor does it require environmental
review to become so onerous that it precludes the action being
studied. Indeed, CEQ regulations seek to reduce delay and to eliminate duplication of effort with state and local environmental requirements. 34 The procedural focus of NEPA is in marked contrast to the
specific substantive regulation contained in federal legislation enacted
after NEPA.
2.

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act and Amendments

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act and Amendments
(FWPCA), discussed earlier, differ from NEPA in that the FWPCA
is not concerned with a broad view of the environmental consequence
of a given action, but rather focuses upon specific actions and
prohibits them without permit. It is therefore substantive and not
procedural in nature.
For the instant analysis, the FWPCA can be divided into three
parts. First, the Act addresses the question of water pollution generally. Second, it deals with water quality certification. Finally, the
FWPCA addresses dredge and fill permits. Each aspect of the FWPCA
will be discussed briefly below.
(a) General Water Pollution Control
The general water quality control mandated under the FWPCA
includes two distinct areas of control: (1) The achievement of effluent
limitations on point sources of pollution, and (2) the achievement of
acceptable water quality standards. The term "effluent limitation"
means "any restriction established by a State ...

on quantities,

rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other
constituents which are discharged from point sources into navigable
waters. . . .-1 The term "point sources" means "any discernible,

33.

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Greater Boston

Television Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cerl.
denied, 401 U.S. 950 (1972).

34.

See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.5 (1987) (providing an extensive description of methods that

are to be employed to avoid delay due to environmental review). Among the specific items
mentioned are the elimination of duplication with state and local environmental procedures,
joint preparation of environmental documents with state and local agencies, and the adoption
of appropriate environmental documents prepared by another agency. Id.
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (1982).
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confined and discrete conveyance ... from which pollutants are or
may be discharged. This term does not include return flows from
3' 6
irrigated agriculture.
The discharge of pollutants into a navigable body of water from
a point source is restricted. The requirement of National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits for discharges is a
means of achieving and enforcing effluent limitations in receiving
waters. 37 The NPDES obligates point source discharges of pollutants
to meet applicable effluent limitations. It is unlawful under the
FWPCA to discharge pollutants over an established effluent limitation.38 As noted above, effluent limitations are to be established to
protect the water resources.3 9 This obligation is separate from the
40
obligation to meet "standards" that apply to "pollutants" generally.
Thus, in relevant part, the 1972 amendments focused upon the
prohibition of any discharge of pollutants from a point source
without first obtaining and complying with a permit issued by the
4
relevant entity. '
In addition to the effluent limitation aspects of water quality
control, Congress has delegated to the states responsibilities with
respect to pollutants in water that are not associated with discharges
from point sources. 42 The goal here is to identify water in which
control of pollutant discharges from point sources alone is inadequate
to meet water quality standards. The standards themselves are retained as a supplement to the point source discharge limitations. 43
(b)

Section 401 - Water Quality Certification

Section 401(a)(1)" of the FWPCA provides, in relevant part, that:

36. Id. § 1362(14).
37. Id. § 1342. The FWPCA provides that "[t]he Administrator shall not require a permit
under this section for discharges composed entirely of return flows from irrigated agriculture,
nor shall the Administrator directly or indirectly, require any State to require such a permit."
Id. § 1342(1); see id. § 1362(14) (the term "point source" does not include return flows from
irrigated agriculture). The FWPCA, however, allows state regulation to be more stringent than
regulation under federal law. Id. § 1370. The State of California, in certain instances, regulates
agricultural return flows as well as non-point sources of pollution. See 23 CAL. CODE REcS.
§§ 2205-2234 (1982).
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1982).
39. Id. § 1312(a).
40. Id.
41. See id. §§ 1311, 1342; see also Environmental Protection Agency v. State Water Res.
Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 204-208 (1976).
42. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1313 (1982).
43. Id. § 1313.
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1982).
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Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity
including, but not limited to, the construction or operation of
facilities, which may result in any discharge into the navigable
waters, shall provide the licensing or permitting agency a certification from the State in which the discharge originates or will originate, or, if appropriate, from the interstate water pollution control
agency having jurisdiction over the navigable waters at the point
where the discharge originates or will originate, that any such
discharge will comply with the applicable provisions of .

water quality standards provisions of the Act]

.

. [the

. . .

Section 401(a)(3) 46 provides that certification obtained under the
FWPCA, with respect to construction of any facility, shall fulfill the
certification requirements in connection with any other federal license
or permit required for the operation of such facility, unless notice
to the contrary is given. Section 401 insures that facilities operating
pursuant to a federal license or permit comply with the FWPCA's
general provisions. Licenses or permits can be suspended or revoked
for failure to obtain certification or to meet appropriate effluent
limitations .47
(c) Section 404 - Dredge or Fill Permits
With certain exceptions, 43 section 404 of the FWPCA requires that
a permit be obtained from the Secretary of the Army for the discharge
49
of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States.
In order to obtain a permit to discharge dredged or fill materials,
the applicant must establish that there is no reasonable and practicable alternative to the discharge in question. This is done through

45. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 401(a)(4), 16 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(4) (1982)
(providing similar requirements for projects with federal licenses and permits, but which have
not yet been operated).
46. Id. § 401(a)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(3).
47. Id. § 401(a)(5),(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(5),(d).
48. See id. § 404(0, 16 U.S.C. § 1344(0.
49. Id. § 404(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1344(a). "Waters of the United States" is defined broadly
and by regulation includes "wetlands." See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (1987). Wetlands are defined
as follows:
Those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency
and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support
a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.
Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas.
33 C.F.R. § 288.3(b) (1987).
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an
. alternatives analysis... Where discharges are permitted, mitigation measures are usually incorporated into the permit.5 0
Even after the Secretary of the Army has determined that a permit
should be issued, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency can independently determine, after notice and opportunity
for public hearing, that the discharge of dredged or fill materials
"will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas" and thus preclude the
51
issuance of a permit.
The FWPCA is broad-based in its protection of water quality and
has application in one form or another in almost any situation
involving the water resource.
3.

FederalEndangered Species Act

In enacting the Federal Endangered Species Act (FESA)52 Congress
determined that "all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to
conserve endangered species and threatened species and shall utilize
their authorities in furtherance of the purpose of this chapter." 53
Section 7 of the FESA 54 requires all federal agencies to consult with
the Secretary of the Interior to insure that federal actions are "not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species
or threatened species ... unless such agency has been granted an
exemption for such action . .. .- '
A finding of "jeopardy" under the FESA precludes the action in
question, unless an exemption is granted.5 6 In addition to the listing
of species, the Act requires a designation of "critical habitat" for
each species listed. The term "critical habitat" may include the
geographical area occupied by the species at the time of its listing,
as well as other areas determined essential for the conservation of

50.
51.

Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 404(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (1982).
Id. § 404(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1344(c). See, e.g., Bersani v. Robichaud, 850 F.2d 36 (2d

Cir. 1988) (discussion of veto authority).

52. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1543 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988).
53. Id. § 1531(c)(1). See Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257
(9th Cir. 1984).

54.

16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1982).

55. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
56. The Act also prohibits the taking of listed species in a manner similar to the provisions
of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Bald Eagle Protection Act. Id.
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the species.5 7 Section 7 consultations require a determination of a
particular action's effect upon critical habitat.-I
The FESA addresses fish and wildlife needs in a manner similar
to the way the FWPCA addresses the physical environment. The
physical environment, as well as fish and wildlife concerns, must be
addressed under NEPA.
B.

CaliforniaEnvironmental Protection of the Water Resource
1. The California Environmental Quality Act

The California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA")5 9 was adopted
soon after NEPA and uses NEPA as a model. However, CEQA
extends the environmental review requirements further than NEPA.
CEQA, for example, does not limit itself to the effect of agency
actions. Rather, environmental review (an environmental impact report or EIR) must be undertaken for "any project ...

[an agency

intends] to carry out or approve which may have a significant effect
on the environment."0 The EIR was intended as an informational
document which must be considered by public agencies before approving or disapproving a project. 6 1 Unlike NEPA, CEQA has a
substantive quality to it. As a consequence, when an EIR identifies
at least one significant effect, a public agency may not approve or
carry out a project unless it finds that mitigation measures have been
adopted that "mitigate or avoid" the environmental effect identified
in the report. 62
2.

The Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act

The Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act (Porter-Cologne)63
contains the State of California's statutory framework for controlling
water quality. Porter-Cologne contemplates a joint effort between
local Regional Water Quality Control Boards and the State Water

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. § 1532(5)(A).
Id. § 1536(a)(2).
CAL. Put.
RES. CODE §§ 21000-1177 (vest 1986).
Id. §§ 21100, 21151.
Id. § 21061.
Id. §§ 21002.1(c), 21081(a), (b).
CAL. VATER CODE §§ 13000-13009 (West 1971 & Supp. 1988).
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Resources Control Board (SWRCB). It is through Porter-Cologne
that the Regional Water Quality Control Boards and the SWRCB
implement the provisions of the FWPCA within California. The
Regional Water Quality Control Boards and the SWRCB are also
the designated agencies within the State of California for the issuance
of FWPCA section 401 certifications.
3.

Stream Bed Alteration Agreements

While Porter-Cologne does not have a provision similar to the
FWPCA section 404 permit procedure, the California Fish and Game
Code does contain provisions which have a similar effect upon
development activities within stream systems.64 Among other things,
these Code provisions make it unlawful for any person to "substantially divert or obstruct the natural flow or substantially change the
bed, channel, or bank of any river, stream or lake . .. or use any
material from streambeds . "..65
without prior notice as provided
by the Code66 and an agreement (1603 Agreement) which may include
conditions imposed upon the individual or entity who wishes to
undertake the work in question.6 7
4.

The CaliforniaEndangered Species Act

The California Endangered Species Act (CESA) 61 provides that it
is state policy to conserve, protect, restore and enhance endangered
species and threatened species, and their habitat, because of their
ecological, educational, historical, recreative, aesthetic, economic and
scientific value to the people of California; and that all state agencies,
boards and commissions must join in this effort.
While these sections provide that it is state policy to conserve
endangered and threatened species, this policy is tempered with a
requirement that it be imposed in a "reasonable" fashion. For
example, while the CESA would require the development of "reasonable and prudent alternatives" to a project 69 which would jeop-

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 1600-1607 (West 1984).
Id. § 1603.
Id. § 1601.
Id. §§ 1603, 1607.
Id. §§ 2050-2068 (West 1984 & Supp. 1988).
The term "project" means a project as defined in CEQA. See id.

§ 2064.
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ardize the continued existence of any endangered or threatened
species, it allows individual projects to proceed if "economic, social
or other conditions make infeasible such [reasonable and prudent]
alternatives ... [so long as] appropriate mitigation and enhancement

measures are provided.'

'70

The substantive application of the CESA is somewhat different
than the application of the FESA. The CESA is closely tied to the

provisions of CEQA, and compliance with CEQA, in essence, insures
compliance with the CESA.
IV.

THE

EXCESS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS

As has been outlined above, the law with respect to the environment
has developed from a level of little or no environmental sensitivity
to its current level of considerable. (and in some cases extreme)
protections. Moreover, it has developed not only at the federal level,
but also at the state level.

In most respects the statutory framework for environmental protection is appropriate. However, it must appear obvious to even the
casual observer that the application of all of the environmental

regulation described above, much of which is duplicative, on any
given project by both the federal and state governments has the

potential of preventing even the most worthwhile project from being

developed. 7 1 It can do this, of course, through the substantive pro-

hibitions contained in Acts such as the FWPCA and FESA. However,

70.

Id. § 2054.
The Legislature further finds and declares that it is the policy of the state that
state agencies should not approve projects as proposed which would jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of habitat essential to the continued existence
of those species, if there are reasonable and prudent alternatives available consistent
with conserving the species or its habitat which would prevent jeopardy.
Furthermore, it is the policy of this state and the intent of the Legislature that
reasonable and prudent alternatives shall be developed by the department, together
with the project proponent and the state lead agency, consistent with conserving the
species, while at the same time maintaining the project purpose to the greatest extent
possible.
Id. § 2053. "The Legislature further finds and declares that, in the event specific economic,
social, or other conditions make infeasible such alternatives, individual projects may be
approved if appropriate mitigation and enhancement measures are provided." Id. § 2054.
71. As noted supra, the statutes outlined in this article are merely representative in nature.
The potential for the abuse described herein is even more significant when one considers the
hundreds of other statutes and regulations applicable to any given project that have not been
discussed.
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it can also preclude the development of desired projects through the
application of time-consuming and costly duplicative review requirements and by imposing duplicative and sometimes conflicting substantive terms and conditions to development licenses and permits.
It is this excess that must be avoided. Valid regulation and protection
must not be allowed to fall victim to misuse by those who wish to
block any development, no matter how reasonable, or to mindless
application by those who lose sight of the environmental goals which
gave birth to the statutory and regulatory structure. The problems
associated with this type of excess are perhaps best demonstrated by
way of two hypothetical case examples. One example is specific in
nature; the other is more general.
Case One - Hydroelectric Development7 2

A.

1.

The Federal Power Act

Part I of the Federal Power Act (FPA), which was originally
enacted as the 1920 Federal Water Power Act, 73 created a comprehensive scheme for issuing licenses for the purpose of constructing
and operating hydroelectric facilities in any waters over which Congress had regulatory authority. 74 Under the Act, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) has exclusive jurisdiction to act on
an application for a license to develop a hydroelectric project on a
75
navigable river.
As the legislative history of the Water Power Act demonstrates,
the purpose of this licensing provision was to centralize in one federal
agency the final authority over all hydroelectric projects within the

72. This hypothetical is modeled after the circumstances surrounding the development of
the Sayles Flat Hydroelectric Project, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) License
No. 3195, 24 FERC para. 61,343; 32 FERC para. 61,290. It is important to note, however,
that the problems described herein can exist with respect to any water development activity
which requires federal and state involvement. Given the ambit of the environmental statutes
involved, it is difficult to visualize a water project where the problems discussed herein would

not exist.
73.

Federal Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1077 (1920) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.

§ 792 (1982)).
74.
75.
(1946).

16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152, 160-64
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reach of federal power. 76 During testimony before the House Committee, the Department of Agriculture's representative highlighted
the point that the purpose of the licensing provisions of the Act was
to avoid duplication of work by various federal agencies.
The first step in carrying out the purpose of the bill ... should
consist in coordinating the activities of the three departments [War,
Agriculture, Interior] which have to do with water power in order
that whatever is done by existing agencies may be done under a
consistent plan with a definite end in view that there may be no
duplication of work, overlapping of functions or conflict of au77
thority.
The Attorney General of the United States also interpreted the
licensing provisions of the Act, stating:
[I]t seems clear that it was the purpose of the Congress to bring
under this Act all future power development . . . and to concentrate
in the hands of the Federal Power Commission [FERC's predecessor]
all the administrative authority thereover which was in part previously distributed among the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture,
and War. It is also clear that no further original permits, at least,
were thereafter to be issued by the Secretaries. 78
More recent analyses of the purpose of the Act have been consistent
with these statements. In First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v.
FederalPower Commission,79 for example, the United States Supreme
Court said:
It was the out-growth of a widely supported effort of the conservationists to secure enactment of a complete scheme of national
regulation which would promote the comprehensive development of
the water resources of the Nation, in so far as it was within the
reach of the federal power to do so, instead of the piecemeal,

76. The House Report stated:
The [Water Power] bill ... proposes a method by which the water powers of the
country, wherever located, can be developed by public or private agencies under
conditions which will give the necessary security to the capital invested and at the
same time protect and preserve every legitimate public interest. It provides that the
administration of water power within Federal jurisdiction, which have hitherto been
handled independently by three separate departments ... in order that duplication
may be avoided, that a common policy may be pursued, and that the combined
efforts of the three agencies may be directed toward a constructive national program
of intelligent, economical utilization of our resources.
H. R. REP. No. 61, 66th Cong. 1st Sess. 5 (1919) (emphasis added).
77. See Scenic Hudson Preserv. Conf. v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 162, 165-66 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (quoting testimony of Mr. O.C. Merrill of the Department of Agriculture during the
House Water Power Committee Hearings, March 18 to May 15, 1918).
78. 32 Op. Att'y Gen. 525, 528 (1921).
79. 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
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restrictive, negative approach of the River and Harbor Acts and
other federal Laws previously enacted. 80
It is in this context that the relationships between FERC and all
other federal agencies must be understood. Although the Act gives
FERC exclusive authority to issue licenses, the Act also provides a
mechanism by which the valid responsibilities of these other federal
entities may be exercised. Section 4(e) of the Act provides that FERC
licenses "shall be subject to and contain such conditions as the
Secretary of the department under whose supervision such reservation
falls shall deem necessary for the adequate protection and utilization
of such reservation." 8'
In Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Indians,n the question
before the Court was whether FERC, in issuing a hydroelectric facility
license, was required to include, as part of the facility license,
conditions submitted by the Secretary of the Interior. 83 After surveying the legislative history of the FPA, the Supreme Court concluded
that:
[I]t is thus clear enough that while Congress intended that the
Commission would have exclusive authority to issue all licenses, it
wanted the individual Secretaries to continue to play the major role
in determining what conditions would be included in the license in
4
order to protect the resources under their respective jurisdiction.1
While FERC must include section 4(e) conditions in the license,
the Secretary of another agency may not veto the Commission's
decision to issue a license. Conditions insisted upon by the Secretary
must be "reasonably related" to the legitimate concerns of the
Secretary. 85 The Act also addresses the determination of whether the
proposed conditions are "reasonably related" to other agencies'
legitimate concerns. Section 313(b) provides that FERC orders, including hydroelectric licenses, can be reviewed in the United States
Court of Appeals where the licensee is located.8 6 If an individual or
agency wishes to challenge FERC's decisions with respect to a license
87
condition, it may do so in the courts of appeals.

80.
81.
82.
83.

First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop., 328 U.S. at 180.
16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1982).
466 U.S. 765 (1984).
Escondido Mutual Water Co., 466 U.S. at 767.

84.
85.
86.

Id. at 775 (emphasis added).
Id. at 777.
Id. at 777 n.19; 16 U.S.C. § 82511(b) (1982).

87.

U.S.C. § 7251(b). See Escondido Mutual Water Co., 466 U.S. at 777.
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The statutory scheme is clear. As part of FERC's decision-making
process, agencies with an interest in the property at issue submit
conditions that will serve to protect the interests they are charged
with guarding. 8 FERC then makes its decision on the license and,
if the license is approved, the conditions submitted by the other
agencies must be included. Anyone protesting the license or the
conditions has available an expeditious appeal to the court of appeals.
2.

Regulatory Excess at the Federal Level

As part of the licensing process, FERC must, of course, comply
with the requirements of NEPA as well as with the constraints of
the FESA. Moreover, and as a direct result of the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Escondido, FERC must include within
the license all terms and conditions forwarded to it by other federal
agencies pursuant to section 4(e) of the Federal Power Act. The
statutory scheme envisioned by Congress not only places the comprehensive planning (technical and environmental) for hydroelectric
licensing in FERC, but by so doing, prevents the regulatory excess
that might otherwise exist if a potential licensee had to obtain
necessary approvals from each of the federal agencies that might
have jurisdiction over an aspect of the proposed project. 89
Two areas of significant environmental concern, however, fall
outside of the constraints of FERC jurisdiction and, as a consequence, have the ability to disrupt the orderly process established by
Congress. First, in Monongahela Power Co. v. Alexander,9" the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals determined that the Corps
of Engineers section 404 permitting authority exists concurrently with
88. State agencies may intervene in the FERC licensing process and ask that terms and
conditions be added to the license to protect their interests. Moreover, Section 9 of the Act
provides that FERC should be aware of all state and local laws and regulations relevant to
the project, but need not compel compliance with the provisions of those laws and regulations,
89. This is exactly what happened with respect to the Sayles Flat Hydroelectric Project.
The Project was planned for the South Fork of the American River on lands of the United
States in Eldorado National Forest. After the Project was licensed, the United States Forest
Service (which had not proposed any conditions pursuant to Section 4(e) of the Federal Power
Act) insisted that the Project's proponents obtain a Special Use Permit which contained
environmental mitigation measures over and above those contained in the license obtained
from FERC. The costs and operational modifications caused by this additional environmental
regulation had an adverse effect upon the viability of the Project. It appears, however, that
since Escondido the United States Forest Service, with respect to projects licensed after the
date of that opinion, has accepted the limitations imposed on its actions by Section 4(e). See
supra note 86 and accompanying text.
90. 809 F.2d 41 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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FERC's licensing authority. As noted above, this section of the
FWPCA requires a permit before any dredge or fill material is
discharged into waters of the United States. The section 404 permitting process is itself complex and can result in terms and conditions
being imposed upon the permittee which may be inconsistent with
those in the FERC license.
Moreover, the Secretary of the Army or the Administrator of the
EPA may deny the permit, under certain circumstances, thus precluding the project's construction even if it is licensed by FERC.
There appears to be no reason why this potential conflict need exist,
nor why an applicant must proceed through two federal procedural
mechanisms to obtain just one license. Application of the section
4(e) procedure, outlined by the Supreme Court in Escondido, to
section 404 questions would prevent this situation from occurring.
Indeed, this was, in essence, the position advanced by the District
Court which was later reversed by the Court of Appeals.9 1
Second, a project applicant must obtain a FWPCA section 401
water quality certification. The requirement in the abstract presents
no significant problems since the certification really works independently of the project and focuses upon other substantive provisions
of the law. It is intended to ensure that the project, during construction and operation, can comply with previously established water
quality standards. Moreover, the certification is required early in the
process, thus disclosing problems before significant investment is
made by the permittee.
In application, this requirement can create significant environmental roadblocks to projects that FERC determines to be reasonable
and in the public interest. This situation is discussed immediately
below.
3.

Regulatory Excess at the State Level

(a) FWPCA Section 401 Certification and CEQA
As noted above, in order to obtain a FERC license, a FWPCA
section 401 certification is required. In California the certification is

91. Monongahela Power Co. v. Alexander, 507 F. Supp. 385 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, 809
F.2d 41 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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obtained through the Regional Water Quality Control Board or, in
some instances, through the SWRCB. Until recently these certifications were not difficult to obtain for small hydroelectric facilities
and, indeed, most projects received a waiver. In the past few years,
however, this situation has changed. The SWRCB has determined
that the issuance of a section 401 certification or waiver is a "project"
and, as a consequence, CEQA must be complied with prior to any
action taking place. 92 At the very least, this requirement serves to
delay decision making and adds significant costs to the permitting
process. Additionally, since the provision of NEPA already applies
to FERC actions, the CEQA requirement is duplicative in most
respects to reviews already undertaken by FERC. 91
Moreover, the CEQA requirement has the potential of conditioning
the project in a manner inconsistent with FERC conditions; or vetoing
the project by denying certification. A veto by the state (or the
imposition of inconsistent conditions) could occur even if FERC
determines (without consideration of the certification requirement)
that the project is reasonable and in the public interest. This problem
arises from the CEQA mandate to review the whole of a project and
to withhold approval unless the state agency finds that mitigation
measures have been adopted that mitigate or avoid the identified
94
environmental effect.
Duplicate environmental review is improper for two reasons. First,
the state's imposition of its environmental law in a manner inconsistent with FERC or in a manner calculated to veto a FERC-licensed
project is impermissible under the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution. 95 Second, even if duplicative environmental re-

92. See Opinion of Chief Counsel, SWRCB to Regional Board Executive Officers, Division
of Water Rights (March 27, 1985) (water quality certifications and small hydro project
permitting).
93. With respect to the Sayles Flat Hydroelectric Project license, the Ninth Circuit, upon
review of FERC Order Issuing License, determined that NEPA had not been complied with
and, as a consequence, remanded the matter to FERC. See LaFlamme v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 852 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1988).
94. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 21002.1(c), 21081(a), (b). In the Sayles Flat situation, the
SWRCB also asserted that the Project needed to obtain appropriative rights under state law
which would involve, in addition to CEQA, the application of the California public trust
doctrine. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 419 (1983). The SWRCB
asserted that if, based upon its CEQA or public trust review, such action was warranted, it
could condition a water rights permit in a manner inconsistent with the FERC license or even
deny the permit, thereby vetoing the Project. Moreover, the SWRCB asserted that its review
was not limited to the water resource but, under CEQA, must embrace the whole of the
Project.
95. See First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
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view was constitutional, it should be avoided because of the duplicative nature of the review involved and the increased costs associated
with that excess.
It is not necessary for a single project to undergo full scale NEPA
review and full scale CEQA review in addition to the environmental
review required pursuant to FWPCA section 404. And it certainly is
not necessary for a single project to be saddled with mitigation
measures (perhaps inconsistent one with the other) imposed by all of
the various state and federal agencies involved. Instead, the state
agency should drop its CEQA requirement for FWPCA section 401
certification. In the event that it does not, the Administrator of the
EPA should provide the needed certification in the place of the
state. 96
(b) FWPCA Section 404 and Department of Fish and Game
Section 1603 Agreements
As noted above, in addition to the environmental review involved
with obtaining a FERC license, a project licensee must undergo the
environmental review associated with obtaining a FWPCA section
404 permit. This permit allows the discharge of dredge and fill
materials into "waters of the United States," Section 404 permits in
most instances include terms which require mitigation measures to
be undertaken as a condition to permit issuance. These conditions
are in addition to those imposed by FERC in the granting of the
FERC license.
In California, in addition to these two independent federal reviews
of the same project and (if CEQA is applied to a FWPCA section
401 certification) a state review, the Department of Fish and Game
will require anyone whose activities have a substantial effect on a
river, stream, or lake to enter into an agreement which obligates the
project proponent to undertake its work in a specified manner and
may include terms and conditions different from and in addition to
those imposed by FERC or the Corps of Engineers. 97 Thus, the

96. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 401(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1982).
"In any case where a state agency has no authority to give 401 certification, such certification

shall be from the Administrator. [In the absence of action by the state within one year for
application or certification, the certification requirement is waived]." Id. See also id. § 1371(c)
(exempting certain aspects of the FWPCA from NEPA).
97. Mega Renewables v. County of Shasta, 644 F.Supp. 491 (E.D. Cal. 1986).
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potential exists for still more environmental review of the same
actions already reviewed three times. 9 Even if the section 1603
requirement is not preempted under federal law, 99 there appears no
valid reason why the agreement is necessary.
Case Two - Waters of the United States

B.

1.

Development within Waters of the United States

As noted above, a FWPCA section 404 permit is required whenever
dredge or fill material is discharged into waters of the United States.
This can occur with the construction of a dam and the subsequent
impoundment of water. It can also occur when land based construction is contemplated in wetlands. In either event, the environmental
process is likely to be costly, time consuming, and duplicative in
nature.
2.

Regulatory Excess at the Federal Level

In issuing a permit pursuant to FWPCA section 404, the Corps of
Engineers undertakes a basic environmental review pursuant to NEPA.
In conjunction with this activity, it must undertake an "alternatives
analysis" to determine if there are other ways to accomplish the
project purpose than by discharging into waters of the United States.I °°
In the case of water dependent action, such as the construction of a
dam, it is presumed that no alternatives exist. In the case of discharges
into wetlands, the contrary is presumed. Permits, when issued, invariably contain conditions which mandate mitigation measures.
In the process of reviewing the permit, the Corps of Engineers
consults with various federal agencies. The federal agencies involved
normally include the United States Fish and Wildlife Service as well
as the agency which administers the lands in question (assuming
federal lands are involved). The EPA also reviews the project. Each

98. The Sayles Flat Hydroelectric Project obtained section 404
required to enter into section 1603 agreements with the Department of
99. See Mega Renewables v. County of Shasta, 644 F. Supp. 491
100. Federal Water Polution Control Act § 404(b)(1), 16 U.S.C. §

permits and was still
Fish and Game.
(1986).
1344(b)(1) (1982).
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of these agencies is allowed to comment and suggest conditions to
be imposed in the permit.
The EPA, however, also has the authority to review the project
in its own right and can veto the Corps of Engineers' decisions.' 0'
Moreover, in the area of wetlands, the EPA has utilized different
criteria while proceeding under the section 404(b)(1) alternatives
analysis. 0 2 In the case of wetlands, this is compounded by the fact
that the Fish and Wildlife Service, in commenting on applications
for permits to fill wetlands, uses a more expansive definition of
wetlands than does the Corps of Engineers. 03
This overlapping authority for- duplicative review on the federal
level consumes an enormous amount of time and money without
ever providing any degree of certainty that the process can ever be
completed. This review becomes even more excessive when the existence of an endangered or threatened species is involved, or when
critical habitat is at issue. Even if the activity is not precluded
outright by the CESA, the permitting requirements established pursuant to section 7 of the FESA are among the most difficult with
which to comply.
3.

Regulatory Excess at the State Level

The excess described above becomes even more onerous when state
involvement is required. State or local involvement is required in
almost any wetlands situation because of the need for local land use
and other related permitting. In addition to the Department of Fish
and Game's involvement in the FWPCA section 404 process, if an
endangered species or threatened species is involved (assuming listing
under the California Act), the provisions of the CESA may come
into play. This, of course, triggers not only the provisions of the
CESA, but also the provisions of CEQA.' ° Additionally, any activity
associated with waters of the United States may require FWPCA

101. Id. § 404(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1344(c).
102. See, e.g., Bersani v. Robichaud, 850 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988).
103. The Corps of Engineers uses wetland criteria that requires a finding of three physical
facts: (1) Hydrology; (2) hydric soils; and (3) support of vegetation under normal circumstances.
A wetland determination by the Fish and Wildlife Service may require only one of these three
physical facts.
104. The provisions of CEQA may have already been triggered by the local permitting
activity.
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section 401 certification, which also could trigger the provisions of

CEQA.
Activities that are not land based but are related to lakes, streams
or rivers may also involve the Department of Fish and Game's section
1603 agreement process. Activities such as the construction of a dam
and the diversion and impoundment of water will involve the SWRCB
which will proceed through a CEQA analysis as well as a public
trust review of a given project.
V.

METHODS OF AvOIDING REGULATORY EXCESS

Solutions to the regulatory excess described above should not be
found in the weakening of any of the statutory provisions enacted
to ensure basic environmental protection. That basic regulatory structure is sound. Since the abuse is created by the application of
duplicative protections to a single project, solutions must be found
in the reasonable application of the law, combined with consolidation
of the regulatory structure.
A.

Reasonable Application

The reasonable application of environmental regulation and the
use of "common sense" by agencies charged with environmental
protection would achieve more toward avoiding the abuses identified
in this article than any other solution that could be posed. In many
situations the burdens presented by the legal structure are compounded by the predisposition, of agencies to block any development
project, no matter how reasonable. This intransigence must be overcome.
Agencies on both the state and federal level must not engage in
the apparent inter-agency competition to see which agency can be
most protective of the environment. Instead of insisting upon its own
environmental review and its own set of regulatory conditions, each
involved agency should look to the review already conducted on the
proposed development and refrain from doing that which has already
been done by another agency.
In this regard, a great deal of abuse is created not by the statutory
and regulatory structure, but rather by the individual agency's staff
who appear to be on a mission to preserve the environment at all
costs. A common sense solution to the problem, however, will
undoubtedly fail without some type of legislative mandate.
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B.

Consolidation of the Regulatory Structure

Aside from the "common sense" approach advocated above, the
most logical way to address the abuses identified in this article is
through legislation which consolidates responsibilities under the various statutes. Since legislation protecting the environment exists on
both the state and federal level, the solution may not be easy to
achieve. Using the statutes discussed above as a model, the following
sections provide examples of how consolidation could be accomplished.
1.

NEPA/CEQA

NEPA and CEQA already contain the core elements of a state
and federal consolidated review process. NEPA regulations require
federal agencies to cooperate with state agencies in the preparation
of environmental documents. 0 5 This cooperation is to include joint
planning, joint environmental research and studies, joint public hearings, joint environmental assessments, and joint environmental impact
statements. The regulation provides:
Agencies shall cooperate with State and local agencies to the fullest
extent possible to reduce duplication between NEPA and State and
local requirements, unless the agencies are specifically barred from
doing so by some other law. Except for cases covered by paragraph
(a) of this section, such cooperation shall to the fullest extent
possible include [joint environmental impact statements. § ... ] In

such cases one or more Federal agencies and one or more State or
local agencies shall be joint lead agencies. Where State laws or local
ordinances have environmental impact statement requirements in
addition to but not in conflict with those in NEPA, Federal agencies
shall cooperate in fulfilling these requirements as well as those of
Federal laws so that one document will comply with all applicable
laws.
To better integrate environmental impact statements into State or
local planning processes, statements shall discuss any inconsistency
of a proposed action with any approved State or local plan and
laws (whether or not federally sanctioned). Where an inconsistency

105.

40 C.F.R. § 1506.2 (1987).
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exists, the statement should describe the extent to which the agency
would reconcile its proposed action with the plan or law.0 6
NEPA regulations also provide for the adoption of a statement
prepared by another agency or the combination of other environmental documents which may meet the requirements of NEPA, rather
than requiring the preparation of an EIS. 0 7
As was the case with NEPA, CEQA authorized the promulgation
of guidelines for use in the application of CEQA. 0° The CEQA
guidelines seek to reduce delay by establishing specific time limitations
for the preparation of environmental documents'0 9 and seek to eliminate duplication of efforts with the NEPA process." 0
All that is necessary to achieve the desired end of avoiding duplicative review is to make mandatory the optional regulatory provisions
outlined above. This could be accomplished merely by enacting
authorizing legislation for this purpose at either the state or federal
level. This legislation could be as simple as adopting the "lead
agency" concept which exists at both the state and federal levels. M
This concept requires a lead agency to be designated in the preparation of environmental documentation. Other agencies with an interest in the project under review would be required to submit their
concerns to the lead agency for incorporation into the environmental
review, rather than having each agency conduct a review of its own.
As noted above, the lead agency concept exists at both the state
and federal levels but does not exist for projects which involve both
state and federal agencies. Application of the lead agency concept to
projects which fall within both state and federal jurisdiction would
require the designation of one agency, at either the state or federal
level, to be the lead agency. All comments by any state or federal
agency would then be submitted to the lead agency for review. In
this way all environmental review would be consolidated in one
environmental review process without diminishing the input by any
individual or agency.

106. Id. § 1506.2(b),(c),(d).
107. Id. §§ 1506.3, 1506.4.
108. CAL. PuB. Rs. CODE § 21083 (West 1986).
109.
110.

14 CAL. CODE REGS. § 15100-15112 (1986).
Id. § 15170, 15220.
111. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21083.5 (West 1986); 14 CAL. CODE REGS. §§ 15050,
15222; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1506.2 (1987).
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2.

Endangered Species

Consolidation of endangered species considerations with other environmental review may be more difficult to achieve than consolidation under NEPA/CEQA. Nonetheless, such consolidation can be
accomplished.
As noted above, the CESA is closely tied to the provisions of
CEQA.112 In this regard, at the state level a certain amount of
consolidation already exists and the CESA can, therefore, be looked
to as a model for the larger consolidation effort. The CESA adopts
the lead agency concept discussed above and defines the lead agency
for CESA purposes as the same agency that undertakes that role
under CEQA.
The CESA defines the term "state lead agency" as the state agency,
board, or commission which is a lead agency under CEQA."3 The
state lead agency must consult with the California Department of
Fish and Game as it proceeds with the planning of the project in
question." 4 During that consultation the Department of Fish and
Game shall issue a written finding regarding "jeopardy."" ' 5 This
finding also must include the Department of Fish and Game's determination of whether a proposed project will result in any "taking"
of endangered or threatened species. 1 6 If jeopardy is found, the
Department of Fish and Game must determine and specify to the
state lead agency "reasonable and prudent alternatives" consistent
7
with conserving the species which would prevent jeopardy.1
Fish and Game Code section 2092 provides a specific mechanism
for applying the reasonable and prudent alternative criteria, assuming
a finding of jeopardy. 18 This is the exact type of determination that

See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2065 (West 1984).
114. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21104.2 (West 1986).
115. The term "jeopardy" means that a proposed project would jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction of essential
habitat. See CAL. FISH & GAar CODE § 2090 (West 1984).
116. Id. § 2090.
117. Id. § 2091.
118. Fish and Game Code section 2092 provides:
(a) Notwithstanding Section 21081 of the Public Resources Code, if, after consulting
with the department pursuant to Section 2090, jeopardy is found, the state lead
agency shall require reasonable and prudent alternatives consistent with conserving
112.
113.
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must be made to properly protect fish and wildlife beneficial uses,
including endangered species, under Porter-Cologne. Since the entire
question is dealt with in one process, compliance with the provisions
of CESA will, by necessity, also meet the requirements of CEQA
and Porter-Cologne.
Even though the substantive provisions of CESA are different from
the provisions of ESA, there appears no reason why the procedures
outlined above cannot be adopted at the federal level. Moreover, in
light of the discussion regarding NEPA and CEQA, consolidation of
state and federal review under those statutes will also consolidate
state and federal review under ESA and CESA.
3.

Water Pollution Contro!

The most substantively complex area of environmental review may
be the easiest to consolidate. As noted above, the review of water
quality has been preempted, by the United States." 9 All state law in
this area is, therefore, dependent on its meeting the "stringency"
requirement contained in federal legislation. Federal legislation should
be amended to preclude duplicative review such as that posed in the
context of sections 401 and 404.

the species which would prevent jeopardy.
(b) If specific economic, social, or other conditions make infeasible the alternatives
prescribed in subdivision (a), except as provided in subdivision (c), the state lead
agency may approve a project when jeopardy is found, if both of the following
conditions are met:
(1) The state lead agency requires reasonable mitigation and enhancement measures
as are necessary and appropriate to minimize the adverse impacts of the project
upon the endangered species or threatened species, or habitat essential to the
continued existence of the species, including, but not limited to, live propagation,
transplantation, and habitat acquisition, restoration, and improvement.
(2) The state lead agency finds all of the following:
(A) The benefits of the project as proposed clearly outweigh the benefits of the
project were it to be carried out with the reasonable and prudent alternatives
consistent with conserving the species which would prevent jeopardy.
(B) An irreversible or irretrievable commitment made after initiation of consultation required pursuant to Section 2090, of resources to the project, which has the
effect of foreclosing the opportunity for formulating and implementing reasonable
and prudent alternatives consistent with conserving the species which prevent jeopardy, has not been made.
(c) A state lead agency shall not approve a project which would likely result in the
extinction of any endangered species or threatened species. The state lead agency
shall base its determination on the best existing scientific information.
119. Id. § 2092. See, e.g. Power Authority v. Williams, 457 N.E.2d 726, 730-731 (N.Y.
1983). See supra notes 100, 105.
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In general, section 401 certification is undertaken for federal
projects which are themselves development projects. In those cases
full 401 involvement by the state is appropriate. In the section 404
context, however, the federal activity is the act of issuing a permit
to ensure environmental protection. If environmental concerns cannot
be adequately addressed, the Corps of Engineers cannot issue the
permit. In this light, there is simply no need for the Corps of
Engineers, through its process, and the states, through their water
certification process, to be reviewing and, in essence, permitting the
exact same aspect of a single project. The solution here is to exclude
permitting pursuant to section 404 from the ambit of section 401
review.
4.

The Federal Power Act Example

The Federal Power Act was enacted in the 1920s, long before the
enactment of legislation containing the extensive environmental protections discussed above. The FPA, however, in the proper application of section 4(e), probably contains as good a model as can be
developed to address the abuses described in this article. As previously
noted, that statute consolidates the decision-making in one agency
with substantive provision for input from all other interested agencies.
Moreover, by making conditions forwarded by other agencies mandatory on FERC, any institutional bias on the part of FERC toward
20
development is negated.'
VI.

CONCLUSION

The hypothetical cases discussed above demonstrate the potential
for regulatory excess that exists first under a licensing scheme that
was intended to be comprehensive in nature in order to prevent timeconsuming, costly and potentially inconsistent results. Abuse can also
occur under a review scheme that opens up the permitting process
to full review by almost every agency that could have even a remote
interest in the project. The excess demonstrated by these examples is
detrimental in several ways. First, regulatory excess adds costs. The
duplicative environmental review described above multiplies costs to

120.

See supra note 89.
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the detriment of the project's proponent as well as requiring unnecessary fiscal outlay at both the federal and state levels. Second, it
consumes time. The duplicative .review unreasonably delays the ultimate decision-making process to the detriment of the project's proponent and of those who will benefit from the development in
question. Even if the project's proponent can bear the costs associated
with excess environmental review, the proponent is unlikely to be
able to delay development for the time it takes to move through the
process. Third, assuming adequate review undertaken pursuant to
any of the authorities outlined above, the duplicative effort is not
necessary and does not, in any meaningful way, serve to protect the
environment.
A goal of the 1970s was the development of laws that would
procedurally and substantively protect the environment. The goal of
the 1990s may well be the development of methodologies whereby
those laws can be applied without destroying reasonable developmentrelated water resources activities. In most respects these methodologies cannot be obtained through judicial review, although application
of the supremacy clause and a determination of federal preemption,
in some instances, would certainly simplify the problem. Nor can
one expect the problem to be dealt with through voluntary restraint
on the part of the regulatory agencies. Indeed, the history of environmental regulation demonstrates that the contrary is true. The
solution to the problem, if a solution exists, is through legislation
which seeks to consolidate environmental review whenever possible.
Consolidation of the environmental review process addresses each
of the three major concerns enumerated above by ensuring timely,
cost-effective environmental review. Failure to address the problems
identified above may result not only in the loss of reasonable and
beneficial water-related development, but also may create a backlash
that in the long run will prove destructive to the environmental
protections that have taken decades to develop.

